Sunday, 8 February 2026

🌐 VXLAN & BGP Security Design


(Global Best-Practice Architecture)
🔵 PART 1: VXLAN Security Design

VXLAN is a transport technology, not a security protocol.
Security must be implemented in multiple layers.

🟦 1️⃣ Underlay Network Security (IP Fabric)

This is the foundation of VXLAN.

Trusted devices only

OSPF / IS-IS authentication

Separate Management VRF

ACLs between Spine ↔ Leaf

Control-Plane Policing (CoPP)

🎯 Goal: Secure the transport layer

🟩 2️⃣ Control Plane Security (EVPN-BGP)

EVPN uses BGP to exchange MAC/IP routes.

BGP authentication (MD5 / TCP-AO)

Spine as Route Reflector

Leaf as EVPN Client

Strict RT/RD policies

🎯 Goal: Prevent fake route injection

🟨 3️⃣ Overlay Segmentation (Micro-Segmentation)

🚨 Most critical security layer

One Application = One VRF

Separate VNIs per tier

Example:
Frontend → VRF-A
Backend → VRF-B
Database → VRF-C

❌ No communication unless explicitly allowed

🎯 Goal: Limit blast radius

🟥 4️⃣ Distributed Firewall (Zero Trust)

Firewall on every Leaf

Policy based on IP, VM tags, security groups

Rules example:
Frontend ➝ Backend ✅
Frontend ➝ Database ❌

🎯 Goal: Zero-Trust inside the DC

🟪 5️⃣ Encryption & Visibility

MACsec / IPsec / TLS

Flow telemetry, EVPN monitoring

IDS / IPS integration

🎯 Goal: Secure & observe traffic

🌍 PART 2: BGP Security (Worldwide)

BGP authentication & GTSM

Strict route filtering

RPKI validation (Valid / Invalid / NotFound)

Secure Route Reflectors

Anycast, RTBH, DDoS mitigation

Policy-driven routing (Communities, Local-Pref)

🎯 Goal: Protect Internet routing

🏆 Reference Architecture

🌐 Internet
→ 🔐 Edge BGP
→ 🧱 Border Leaf
→ 🧠 Spine (RR)
→ 🔥 Leaf (VTEP + Firewall)
→ 🖥️ Applications



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